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Abstract
The Obama administration has embraced ‘engagement’ as the dominant concept informing
US public diplomacy. Despite its emphasis on facilitating dialogue with and among Muslims
overseas, this article demonstrates that, in practice, engagement aims to leverage social
media and related technologies to persuade skeptical audiences to empathize with American
policies. Indeed, its primary means of implementation – participatory interactions with
foreign publics – is inherently duplicitous. Through the authors’ description of how
engagement is rooted in long-standing public relations and corporate marketing discourses,
and in light of the historical and structural foundations of anti-Americanism, this contempo-
rary public diplomacy strategy is shown to be both contradictory and, ultimately, delusional.
As an alternative, the authors argue that an ethical public diplomacy should be pursued, i.e.,
a public diplomacy that embraces genuine (rather than contrived) dialogue. Although this
approach is difficult to achieve (primarily because it implies a direct challenge to entrenched
US foreign policy norms), it constitutes a mode of public diplomacy that better reflects the
idealized principles of American democracy.
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After a decade of confusion, finger-pointing and, at times, ineptitude, one concept
has emerged as the ‘pillar and guiding principle’ of US public diplomacy (PD)
(Lord and Lynch, 2010: 3). ‘To meet the challenges and seize the opportunities of
the 21st century,’ says a leading State Department official, ‘we need a foreign
policy that uses tools and approaches to match a changing global landscape’ (McHale,
quoted in Lee, 2010: 23). According to the Obama administration, today, it is
‘vital’ that America pursues a PD policy that connects with, listens to and builds
upon ‘long-term relationships with key stakeholders’ (White House, 2009: 4). The
concept that these and many other announcements, reports, and studies are referen-
cing is engagement.
Public diplomacy has been defined as a ‘term to describe the efforts by nations to win
support and a favorable image among the general public of other countries, usually by
way of news management and carefully planned initiatives designed to foster positive
impressions’ (McQuail, 2010: 568). Engagement – the process of interaction and dialo-
gue with foreign publics – itself is not new. All forms of diplomacy, in fact, entail various
strategies involving engagement (Cull, 2008: 13). However, as Richard Arndt demon-
strates in his monumental history of American cultural diplomacy, The First Resort of
Kings, dominant approaches to PD have ebbed and flowed, from ‘advocacy versus cul-
tural communication, direct confrontation versus indirect engagement, hard sell versus
soft, and propaganda versus cultural-educational relations’ (Arndt, 2005: 527). What is
new, however, is the Obama administration’s emphasis on listening and dialogue using
social media and digital communications technologies in the process. This is not to say
that the Obama administration has abandoned efforts to discredit and delegitimize
‘violent extremist networks and ideology.’ Instead, engagement is being pursued to
simultaneously build ‘mutual respect and mutual interest’ with Muslim communities
overseas (White House, 2009: 3–4).
Given that this latest iteration of engagement is upon us, it is time, we think, to con-
textualize and critically examine its premises and implications. In this article, we argue
that Washington’s contemporary embrace of engagement is both misplaced and contra-
dictory. It is misplaced because engagement cannot do what US foreign policy officials
think it can do, and it is contradictory because its likely outcome will be the opposite of
what its proponents claim. Instead of facilitating understanding and trust, engagement
more likely will compound the existing atmosphere of distrust between the American
state and wary publics overseas.
In what follows, first, we contextualize engagement in terms of the marketing
and public relations principles that inform it. We then assess the most recent means
of carrying out engagement – social media, wikis, and other forms of digital commu-
nications – collectively referred to as ‘public diplomacy 2.0.’ We subsequently
address engagement’s contradictions, arguing that the current consensus emerging
around its deployment and potentials constitutes a dangerous delusion. In relation
to this last point, in our conclusion we suggest that a difficult but necessary reforma-
tion is now crucial – moving engagement away from its predominantly marketing and
public relations orientations and towards, instead, a more ethically and democratically
principled approach.
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Contextualizing engagement
To repeat, engagement is fast becoming the guiding concept of US public diplomacy. Its
current importance was underlined in President Obama’s speech in Cairo on 4 June
2009: ‘There must be a sustained effort to listen to each other; to learn from each other;
to respect one another; and to seek common ground.’ To do this, Obama sought ‘broader
engagement’ with the Muslim world in areas including education, economic develop-
ment, and science and technology (Obama, 2009). ‘In today’s complex world,’ echoed
the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, ‘it is critical for
our countries to learn about each other, to have discussions and dialogues’ (McHale,
quoted in Toumi, 2010). According to the State Department’s 2009 report, A New Era
of Engagement, ‘The President and Secretary of State have committed [themselves] to
renewing America’s engagement with the people of the world by enhancing mutual
respect and understanding and creating partnerships aimed at solving common problems’
(State Department, 2009: 26).
But what, precisely, does this mean? Rather than pursuing multiple conversations and
hoping these will yield positive outcomes, it is important to be clear that engagement is
meant to be strategic rather than free-flowing; more a foreign policy calculation than an
open-ended exploration. According to Lord and Lynch, engagement entails
. . . a planned process, based on a carefully researched understanding of the audience and of
its interests, couched in language calibrated to engage the audience in the intended manner,
using the best one- or two-way method of engagement . . . as part of a larger strategy, and
evaluated to determine if it is successful in advancing the intended goals. (Lord and Lynch,
2010: 11)
Various forms of engagement have been utilized throughout American diplomatic
history. Exchange programs, embassy open houses, Voice of America phone-in shows
and similar methods have been used to promote intercultural understanding. However,
since the US Information Agency was disassembled during the latter years of the Clin-
ton administration, these particular capabilities have been relatively neglected.
Furthering this neglect was the Bush administration’s post-9/11 reliance on mostly
one-way forms of communication. Nevertheless, contemporary engagement strategies
centering on digital communications first emerged with President Bush’s final Under
Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, James Glassman. Under
his leadership, a report titled National Framework for Strategic Communication was
completed at the direction of Congress; it explicitly referenced ‘engagement’ along-
side ‘one-way’ PD (White House, 2009).
To explain engagement’s revamped re-emergence, a broader context – one transcend-
ing foreign policy debates – is useful. During the election of 2008, social media technol-
ogies played important roles in the Democratic Party’s success in attracting younger
voters and raising funds. In fact, this campaign mobilized 750,000 volunteers and
8000 online affinity groups. It also set records for fundraising – over US$200 million,
almost half of which were contributions under US$200 (Norquay, 2008). Arguably, the
success of integrating social media with Obama’s presidential campaign constituted the
conceptual bridge linking established uses of the Internet by marketing and public
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relations firms with the new administration’s interest in pursuing ‘public diplomacy 2.0.’
The relative ‘newness’ of the latter was reflected by a statement made by Secretary of
State Hilary Clinton, just days following the mass Iranian uprising in 2009. While admit-
ting that she did not know how to distinguish ‘a Twitter from a tweeter,’ Clinton never-
theless suspected that ‘apparently it’s very important’ (quoted in Morozov, 2009: 10).
The public relations and corporate marketing roots of public diplomacy 2.0 are
revealed by revisiting Edward Bernays’ landmark essay ‘The engineering of consent’
(1947). In it, Bernays explains how a ‘public relations counsel’ could secure public con-
sent to preferred policies. The means to do this involved ‘action based only on thorough
knowledge of the situation and the application of scientific principles and tried practices
to the task of getting people to support ideas and programs’ (1947: 114). The engineering
of consent, he explains, involves targeting specific groups in society (i.e., civic, cultural,
economic, and political) and utilizing appropriate communication channels and mes-
sages to reach and shape them. In sum, Bernays depicts his approach as ‘an instrument
for achieving adjustment if any maladjustment in relationships exists’ (1947: 116).
The tactics Bernays espoused involved listening and responding to the wants, inter-
ests, and needs of publics. In practice, however, early public relations largely involved
one-way communication techniques designed to persuade – or outright deceive – audi-
ences to adopt preferred thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (Heath and Coombs, 2006). In
fact, for Bernays, the techniques of ‘propaganda’ and ‘public relations’ were largely
synonymous (Curtis and Kelsall, 2002). Beginning in the 1970s, scholars associated with
the nascent academic subfield of public relations asserted that the propagandistic tenden-
cies of PR practitioners were inconsistent with a more ‘symmetrical’ ideal that allowed
persuasion to occur in both directions. These analysts claimed that stakeholders could,
and should, be allowed to engage an organization’s managers as a means of modifying
the latter’s behaviors (Grunig and Hunt, 1984).
The so-called ‘two-way symmetrical model’ or ‘Excellence Theory’ or the ‘Gruni-
gian paradigm’ (named after its primary theorist, James Grunig) arose during this period
to legitimate public relations as an academic subfield, bolster the superiority of pluralis-
tic market economies over Soviet-style dictatorships, and improve the image of public
relations in western society more broadly (McKie and Munshi, 2007; Moloney, 2006).
To help do this, Grunig and his collaborators associated their research agenda with Peters
and Waterman’s influential management study titled In Search of Excellence: Lessons
from America’s Best-Run Companies (1982). One result, over the past 25 years, is that
Grunig’s Excellence Theory has dominated public relations research (McKie and Munshi,
2007). In fact, today, it is the most widely used and researched ‘co-creational’ perspective
on public relations – a perspective that ‘sees publics as co-creators of meaning, interpreta-
tions and goals . . . [and one focusing on] long term . . . relationships among publics and
organizations’ (Botan and Taylor, 2004: 652). However, in 1984, Grunig himself specu-
lated that only ‘about 15% of all organizations . . . use the two-way symmetrical model’
(Grunig and Hunt, 1984: 26). Such co-creational approaches continue to be applied in con-
junction with one-way techniques (McKie and Munshi, 2007).
Particularly since the late 1980s, advertisers have similarly pursued consumer-
focused promotional strategies, stressing ‘individual choice’ as a central theme (Prahalad
and Ramaswamy, 2004; Zwick et al., 2009). Among many examples, the reader might
206 the International Communication Gazette 74(3)
recall Apple’s advertisements featuring the empowered consumer shattering a 1984-like
computing dystopia and the US fast food chain Wendy’s emphasis on the customer’s
‘right’ to choose what toppings to have on their hamburgers. Over these years, marketers
emphasized what they called (and still call) ‘brand equity’ – the recognition, shared
increasingly by the culture in toto, that brands are themselves valuable (Harvey,
1989). One outcome has been the importance ascribed to the task of creating, sustaining,
and enhancing brand identities. Thus, just one month after 9/11, it should not have been a
great surprise that the Bush administration appointed Madison Avenue executive Char-
lotte Beers to lead the State Department’s PD response to radical Islam. This initiated the
White House’s effort to ‘re-brand’ America overseas centering on what it referred to as
the ‘Shared Values’ of all civilized peoples – their mutual embrace of democracy, lib-
erty, and private property (White House, 2002). ‘We’re going to have to communicate
the intangible assets of the United States,’ said Beers in late 2001 – ‘things like our belief
system and our values’ (quoted in Ackerman, 2009). As then Secretary of State Colin
Powell explained, ‘There is nothing wrong with getting somebody who knows how to
sell something. We are selling a product. We need someone who can rebrand American
foreign policy’ (quoted in Klein, 2002).
Despite the co-creational rhetoric that accompanied this campaign, it failed. Among
other problems, ‘Shared Values’ contradicted itself, featuring, for example, one-way
monologue advertisements depicting Muslim Americans telling audiences that in the
United States they had rights, liberties, and privately owned possessions. In addition
to the propagandistic tone of these messages, the fact that the US continued to support
regimes in predominantly Muslim countries where human rights, civil liberties, and eco-
nomic development remained, for most, distant abstractions further undermined the
strategy. Such miscalculations continued for most of the Bush years, substantively
improving only in the latter months of the President’s second term when the administra-
tion began to embrace digital technologies that enabled moderate voices in Islamic coun-
tries to be heard among Muslims.
According to the official who introduced this form of engagement, James Glassman,
‘The United States need not be Miss Congeniality to win the war of ideas. We just need
to make moderates hate extremists more than they dislike us’ (Glassman, 2009). With
this in mind, before the Obama administration embraced a similar strategy, Glassman
recognized the Internet to be a powerful means of interacting with audiences, linking
up selected organizations from around the world in order to buoy those elements of
Islamic civil society that favor non-radical forms of discourse. This approach also reflected
a paring back of US PD goals – moving PD away from converting supporters of ‘radical
Islam’ towards, instead, a more ‘targeted marketing’ effort. Rather than communicating
to a mass audience, Glassman’s brief tenure as Under Secretary of State for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs sparked a shift to engaging Muslims already inclined to
reject violence, as well as people who have access to interactive media (e.g., the relatively
young among Islamic countries’ middle classes). This shift was predictable in that success-
ful marketing strategies almost always direct their communications at a limited number
of prospective consumers – those with whom one’s message will most likely resonate.
Glassman also espoused a policy that coincided with soft power’s emphasis on the power
of attraction. Through what he called ‘diversion’ – ‘the channeling of potential recruits
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away from violence with the attractions of entertainment, culture, . . . sports’ – at least
some extremist anger, he thought, could be rechanneled (Glassman, 2008).
Glassman’s successor, Obama appointee Judith McHale, has pursued a similar
approach. As the former CEO of the Discovery Channel and an experienced broadcast-
ing executive, she has emphasized two tasks. First, ‘market research’ as ‘a critical com-
ponent of effective mass communication’ (Feulner, 2010) and, second, embracing
‘Web 2.0’ (social media) capabilities as an opportunity to ‘engage people directly’
(McHale, 2009). Today, just as marketing concepts involving digital communications
(from Twitter to Facebook to wikis) have become predominate, engagement – as a stra-
tegic, targeted, and managed ‘dialogue’ – has emerged as a core pillar of US PD policy.
The parallels between marketing and public relations and more recent PD reforms are
significant for reasons that transcend historical context. To reiterate, through the articu-
lation of their two-way symmetrical model of public relations in 1984, Grunig and Hunt
argued that ‘excellent’ organizations use research to understand stakeholders, foster dia-
logue, and create beneficial outcomes for all. This perspective ‘severed the [explicit]
connection between public relations and propaganda’ established by Bernays four
decades earlier (McKie and Munshi, 2007: 34). However, adherents of this model have
only vaguely explained how symmetrical relationships can be achieved. For example,
activists who have recently helped to ban cigarette smoking in bars and restaurants
in various US cities use patterns of communication that do not square with images
of ‘symmetrical’ interaction with tobacco companies (Stokes and Rubin, 2010). More
to the point (and important for today’s proponents of engagement in PD), examples of
disempowered publics using two-way symmetrical communication to affect change are
rare (McKie and Munshi, 2007). Typically, studies invoking symmetry do so from a
status quo perspective, more often than not omitting the voices of others who might
undermine the dominant organization’s claims of mutual benefit. Following their com-
prehensive review of the development, use, and critique of the two-way symmetrical
model, McKie and Munshi (2007: 36) conclude: ‘We continue to perceive the two-
way symmetrical form as one, or all, of the following: flawed, largely normative at best
(and, at worst, misleading in its promise of equality of exchange amid realities of
uneven power), very restricted in practice, and, to date, structured in support of socially
exclusionary practices.’
A similar critique can be leveled in relation to claims made supporting contemporary
engagement. For example, the Obama administration’s arguments generally parallel
those made by ‘symmetrists’ in that effective PD requires both listening and dialogue.
When engagement is operationalized, however, the realities and complexities of commu-
nication undercut the concept’s ideals. Stakeholders – whether they are publics or con-
sumers – take part in a process that is inescapably influenced by their own subjective
experiences and intersubjective cultural biases. How people think about and process their
interactions, therefore, can be modified, not just by what is communicated but also
through the communication process itself. It is in this context that the billions of dollars
being funneled into PD (like the hundreds of billions spent on marketing each year) is not
an investment being made to enable Muslims and Americans to simply interact. Like the
corporation that welcomes consumer feedback on its branding efforts but not its role in
global warming, exploiting labor, or supporting corrupt governments, Undersecretary
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McHale says that America wants to ‘create an environment in which people can
debate . . . as friends. They can get angry at each other but not necessarily end up hating
each other’ (McHale, 2010; emphasis added). However, engagement cannot sidestep the
presence of power asymmetries in international and intercultural relations – asymmetries
that shape and structure interactions between the American state and foreign publics. For
example, in 2010, the Obama White House was compelled to decline invitations by civil
rights groups to monitor elections in Egypt and, thus, give candidates backed by the Mus-
lim Brotherhood and other militant Islamic organizations the opportunity to win an oth-
erwise rigged process. In this regard, both US strategic interests in the Middle East and
American liberal biases regarding the legitimacy of prospective governments in other
cultures trump American political principles and, frequently, PD messages.
Just as individual consumers do not autonomously recognize their long-term collec-
tive interests – at least not in the organized ways needed to significantly modify the menu
of commodities available to them (Barber, 2008) – the promise that an engagement-
centered PD will yield mutually beneficial outcomes is disingenuous. Engagement
therefore is perhaps better understood as a relatively participatory form of persuasion;
a form of persuasion crafted to generate some amount of tolerance for otherwise
entrenched US policies. In Washington, to carry this argument forward, the discourse
of engagement soothes American policymakers (and publics) who seek the symbolism
of dialogue yet find some kind of psychic security in the fact that its outcome will not
destabilize the status quo. Indeed, the first page of the Obama administration’s
National Framework for Strategic Communication (2009) prescribes engagement
because, to quote it directly, it instrumentally ‘allow[s] us to convey credible, consis-
tent messages, develop effective plans and to better understand how our actions will be
perceived’ (White House, 2009: 1).
The ascent of public diplomacy 2.0
To repeat, engagement has been accompanied by a growing enthusiasm for social media/
Web 2.0 developments. Importantly, Web 2.0 itself is not a technology, nor even a new
Internet-based application. Instead, as Vincent Manzerolle explains, it is ‘a set of mar-
keting discourses regarding the interactive and personally empowering nature’ of ICTs.
Specifically,
Web 2.0 reflects a concerted effort to re-brand the commercial opportunities of the web,
advocating its incorporation into professional and social settings via an assemblage of inter-
active, networked, and digital media. In addition to the perception of empowered users
across a variety of technologically mediated settings, . . . [it] reflects a new web-based mar-
keting approach that strategically employs user-generated content in the production and tar-
geting of commercial messages. (Manzerolle, forthcoming)
Web 2.0 reflects the promotion of a less regulated online marketplace alongside more
consumer choice. Indeed, the discourses now pervading Web 2.0 effectively fuse myths
concerning individual empowerment through technology with the political ideals long
propagated inWiredmagazine, namely its version of Jeffersonian democracy (Barbrook,
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2007). This is worth remembering as innumerable analyses of the turn to social media by
PD officials often reduce it to unprecedented capabilities associated with digital commu-
nications. In other words, to fully comprehend the potency of relating Web 2.0 to its PD
binary, the historical, social, and political power it implies needs to be recognized.
During McHale’s confirmation hearing in 2009, she emphasized the PD potentials of
the Internet. ‘New technology,’ she explained, ‘used effectively and creatively, can be a
game changer . . . [as it provides] the opportunity to move from an old paradigm, in
which our government speaks as one to many, to a new model of engaging interactively
and collaboratively across lines that might otherwise divide’ (McHale, 2009). The basis
of this ‘game changing’ strategy stems, at least indirectly, from a similar crisis facing
marketers involving audience inattention (and sometimes even resistance). Co-
creation and what is called ‘prosumption’ emerged in response to economic problems
facing corporations over the past few decades.1 These include, first, an increasingly cyni-
cal consumer distrustful of commercial culture and its false promises; second, the diffi-
cult task of being heard in an ever more cluttered promotional environment; and third, in
more general public relations terms, the potential for organizations to lose the trust of
publics, especially in an information-rich culture characterized by the use of the Internet
to widely and instantaneously disseminate news, rumors and, occasionally, outright fab-
rications (Botan and Taylor, 2004).
Using new technologies – social media and mobile devices in particular – corporate
strategists have responded by engaging publics and prospective customers with fun,
interactive, and ego-enhancing pursuits, encouraging people to take part in developing
‘their’ brands by participating in a range of activities. A core goal of co-creation and pro-
sumption, therefore, is to engage people; not just to impel them to produce components
of the commodities they buy, but also to involve individuals in ways that entail closer
connections with particular brands.
One striking example of this strategy is the public relations firm Ketchum’s work with
the Doritos brand. In a campaign that won a 2009 Silver Anvil award for excellence from
the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA), Doritos promoted its consumer-created
content by airing fan-made Super Bowl commercials in 2007, 2008, and 2009. In 2009,
Doritos offered US$1 million for the fan whose commercial became the first-ever to
reach No. 1 in USA Today’s ad meter (which ranks Super Bowl advertisements from
most to least favorite among national audiences). The day following the Super Bowl,
USA Today revealed Doritos was No. 1, thus ‘turning the unemployed winners into mil-
lionaires and media darlings over night’ (Public Relations Society of America, 2009: 1).
As a cautionary tale, US officials now deploying similar techniques (such as the State
Department’s ‘Democracy Is’ annual video competition) might want to note the fact that
the winning Doritos’ ‘homemade’ advertisement in 2009 depicted an office worker
throwing a snow globe at his boss’s genitals. Visitors to the ‘Democracy Is’ website are
told that their ‘challenge’ is to ‘create a short video that completes the phrase ‘‘Democ-
racy is . . . ’’. ’ One of the winners of the 2010 competition, Yared Shumete, an Ethiopian,
argued in his video that democracy is ‘fair play’ by depicting two teenage boys equitably
collaborating and participating in a game.
Another inspiration for co-creation and prosumption is the success of wikis – online
sites with content that almost anyone can add to or modify. The largest of these is the
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online encyclopedia called Wikipedia. Although the most commonly cited motivation
for contributing to Wikipedia is an interest in sharing information, the site routinely is
used to promote commercial and political interests. And while wikis sometimes are por-
trayed as transcending the instrumental logic of capital accumulation (rekindling, for
some, a pre-capitalist ‘commons’ or ‘gift economy’), marketers see a different future.
The owner of Wikia, Inc. thus far has established (or has hosted the co-creation of) more
than 1500 specialized wikis. The most popular of these concern movie franchises and
video games, all of which generate revenue by linking niche market consumers to cor-
porations, enabling the latter to engage prospective customers, utilize their unpaid labor,
and exchange information with them in order to pursue ever more personalized market-
ing strategies (Comor, 2010; Parfeni, 2009).
Similarly, social media sites such as Facebook (whose executives, along with other
Web 2.0 champions, now act as consultants for US PD agencies including the State
Department) strive to engage people online, encouraging them to network with their
‘friends’ as a means of generating precise and timely data for marketers (Zwick et al.,
2009: 168–171). Public diplomacy officials in Washington are pursuing similar strate-
gies, aiming to forge ‘relationships’ with targeted Muslims and others around the world,
profile them, monitor their views and activities, and, of course, develop the means of dia-
loguing with them. To quote Facebook executive Elliot Schrage:
. . . the question is how do you build an audience? How do you establish a community of
interests? That’s as true for the maker of laundry detergent as it is for someone who has a
stimulus package for economic growth . . . [I]t’s about communicating a message, finding a
community, and building that community, engaging that community. So, do I see Facebook
as being an incredibly valuable tool for public diplomacy? Absolutely. (Schrage, 2009)
For the Obama administration, whether America’s engagement is government-to-
government or citizen-to-citizen, low-tech or high-tech, the goal is not to truly democra-
tize PD. Instead, it is to use more engaging forms of public diplomacy to promote Amer-
ican perspectives, including liberal democratic values. According to Schrage, the very
accessibility and use of social media itself communicates a powerful message. In keep-
ing with Marshall McLuhan’s aphorism, ‘the medium is the message,’
I’d say Facebook and sites like it do three things that are really important. First, we create
an opportunity for people to see the world through the wisdom of their friends. The
information they get is culled not by some distant, remote editor, but by . . . the opinions and
ideas of their friends. Point number two is, Facebook and sites like it create a real premium
on authenticity. Who are you, and how do you express who you are in a way that I can
understand it? . . .And third, they create a whole new level of accountability, because I get
to see what you care about, what you’re thinking about, and it’s not just static, but you see it
over time. (Schrage, 2009)
Thus, as with theWeb 2.0 co-creation or prosumption of a commercial brand, US efforts
to engage via ‘public diplomacy 2.0’ are not just about talking and listening. After all, the
dialogue that is being promoted is itself a technique crafted to foster authenticity and trust.
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Engagement’s contradictions
Supporting ‘public diplomacy 2.0’ are several studies and reports recommending the
formation of public–private partnerships or quasi-public organizations charged with con-
ducting audience research, analyzing foreign preferences and opinions, and producing
and disseminating co-creation/prosumption-related policy advice and PD resources
(Lord, 2008; Peterson et al., 2003). Thus, while non-government organizations and com-
mercial interests have long been involved in funding and administering PD programs
(Gregory, 2008), to some extent it is the private sector’s marketing expertise, its innova-
tive use of communications technologies, and its rapidly emerging capabilities related to
co-creation that inform much of the enthusiasm for online modes of engagement among
American PD officials. Private sector organizations involved in PD have a vested interest
in maintaining their leadership positions (Fitzpatrick, 2009).
The discourses of engagement and ‘public diplomacy 2.0’ are evident within the
National Framework for Strategic Communication (White House, 2009). This document
lists three objectives for current US PD efforts. First, it stresses the need for foreign audi-
ences to ‘recognize areas of mutual interest with the United States’; second, it wants to
enable foreign audiences to ‘believe the United States plays a constructive role in global
affairs’; and third, it hopes foreign audiences will come to see the United States as a
‘respectful partner in efforts to meet complex global challenges’ (2009: 6). These objec-
tives, in turn, reflect a number of more specific developments accompanying Obama’s
election in 2008. One is the re-recognition that exchange and local outreach programs tend
to break down cultural barriers. Another is that new social media platforms such as Face-
book and Twitter constitute valuable resources that (somehow) need to be utilized. Finally,
Obama’s victory marked an opportunity to re-ignite US PD through a multilateral
approach to foreign policy, intercultural dialogue, and, indeed, ‘Brand Obama’ himself.
As discussed, engagement implies genuine discussion and listening. Equally impor-
tant is the fact that it involves an occasional policy response, reflecting the fact or
impression that others have been heard. Such responses or, as Admiral Michael Mullen
(the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) puts it, actions, speak louder than
words. ‘We need to worry a lot less about how to communicate our actions,’ said the
Admiral in 2009, ‘and much more about what our actions communicate’ (Mullen,
2009: 3). To extrapolate, ‘the product’ – US foreign policy – ultimately must ‘deliver’
in that components of the American state’s activities will need to be reformed in
response to what foreign publics want.
As with building a brand or the pursuit of an effective public relations strategy,
engagement itself is being built on fostering dialogue, listening to audiences, and build-
ing trust in the pursuit of ‘mutually beneficial’ outcomes. In this regard, branding, public
relations, and engagement also involve the establishment, maintenance, and sometimes
even the transformation of the communicating organization’s actions vis-a-vis public
expectations. ‘Every action that the United States Government takes sends a message,’
says the Obama White House, ‘actions well beyond those managed by the communica-
tions community have communicative value and impact’ (White House, 2009: 3).
The fact that such principles were only sporadically followed by the preceding Bush
administration should not surprise us as genuine dialogue has never been, nor is it
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currently, on the agenda. Just as commercial invitations to participate in co-creation are
delimited by the structural parameters of what corporations must do to maximize profits,
to imagine that significant pillars of American foreign policy – particularly those that
anger Muslim publics overseas – will be modified through engagement is, in practice,
a fantasy. According to Rami Khouri, Director of the Issam Fares Institute of Public
Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, the most important
of these policies for anti-American Muslims are Washington’s support for autocratic
regimes, its application of double standards in relation to both its own activities and
Israel’s, and, more abstractly, US policies that support the structural conditions (e.g.,
neoliberal globalization) that are perceived to be behind the ongoing poverty experi-
enced by millions around the world (Khouri, 2003).2
‘Does a great corporation,’ asks Richard Arndt, ‘blame its public relations or its ad
agency for an inferior product?’ Fundamentally, he concludes, ‘no amount of ingenuity
in ‘‘getting the story out’’ can paper over a bad story . . .All these reports, looking to the
panacea of propaganda [or PD], forget that image is a surface manifestation of what
lies beneath’ (Arndt, 2005: 545). Yet, if the products (i.e., the policies) are, indeed,
openly debated, the outcome might well contradict US public diplomacy’s strategic
purpose. In the words of Bruce Gregory, ‘Shared understandings may not overcome
deep disagreement on interests and issues. Exchanges [and other such modes of
engagement] may reinforce hostilities and competing values, particularly if others
experience an America that is myopic, hubristic, and uniformed about the world’
(Gregory, 2005: 10–11).
Adding to the disingenuousness of the Obama administration’s embrace of
engagement is its domestic public opinion implications. For example, in the Fall of
2010, the administration faced broadly based criticism because it was perceived to
be listening to foreign concerns with regard to an American pastor’s threat to burn
Qur’ans in response to a proposed Islamic cultural center being built near ‘ground zero’
in New York. If nothing else, this instance underlines the fact that, even if foreign
views are ‘heard,’ US policymakers are unlikely to credit such dialogues for their deci-
sions. As with most national governments, the American state surely could not admit
that its engagement with foreigners substantively modified its sovereign policy-
making process.
Additionally, for the foreseeable future the US will remain dependent on foreign
oil. As a result of this and other strategic priorities, US foreign policy officials will
remain active in their support of authoritarian and corrupt governments. The Ameri-
can state also will continue to use its political-economic resources to defend its
national interests almost regardless of how these impact lives in other countries. In
light of such realities, the goal of engagement becomes clearer. Engagement is not
being pursued to promote understanding and trust between Americans and foreign
Muslims. Instead, the objective is to foster an environment in which Muslims them-
selves may come to understand US policies in ways that delimit negative associations.
This objective, we believe, has a dangerous implication. Specifically, engagement, as
it is now defined and being operationalized, reproduces the notion that American pol-
icies will not have to change (at least not substantively) for Islamic publics to one day
empathize with US activities.
Comor and Bean 213
Reforming engagement
According to the Pew Research Center, the approval ratings for both Obama and the US
in predominantly Muslim countries have plunged as the optimism generated by the Pre-
sident’s election has faded. Of particular concern are ongoing US policies concerning
Afghanistan, Iran, and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. In response to Pew’s core ques-
tion – ‘Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the international policies of President
Barrack Obama?’ – the declines from 2009 to 2010 have been precipitous. In Egypt, for
example, this approval figure went from 38% to 17%. In Jordan, it fell from 27% to 15%.
More revealing, perhaps, are the declining approval figures related to the administra-
tion’s handling of Iraq. Despite Obama’s commitment to withdraw all but 50,000 troops,
79% of Egyptians and 74% of Jordanians ‘disapprove’ (Pew, 2010). Publics in predomi-
nantly Islamic countries generally know that in addition to 50,000 US troops, 100,000
private military contractors and at least 6000 ‘security contractors’ also will remain
(Corcoran, 2010). To quote one op-ed piece from the Cairo-based newspaper Al-Ahram,
‘it still remains the case that if Obama is to improve the U.S.’s image in the Arab world
he has to change those policies and attitudes that were directly responsible for sowing
anti-U.S. hatred’ (Abdel-Atti, 2010).
As implied throughout our analysis, engagement, as it is now conceptualized and
practiced, is not going to work. We agree with Shelton Gunaratne, who argues that
PD, as it is currently practiced, ‘is a battle that neither party [the US government nor its
rivals] can win in the long run’ (2005: 766). Does this mean that a return to more uni-
directional, monologue-based forms of public diplomacy is inevitable? We hope not.
Instead, we propose radically revising the policy of engagement with a rhetorical
approach – a rhetorical approach based on ethical communication.
At its root, an ethical communication strategy maintains that people have the right and
prospective ability to obtain and judge messages and make decisions that affect them
(Heath et al., 2009). This perspective requires that good communicators must, first, be
good listeners – listeners who want ‘to know, appreciate, and respect what others believe
and think – and why they hold those positions’ (Heath, 2009: 19). But more than merely
listening and understanding, this approach requires entering into spirited debate to
instantiate the democratic process. In effect, it ‘presumes that any position voiced in pub-
lic must be sufficiently compelling to withstand vigorous critiques by other [speakers] who
believe their compelling ideas have merit’ (2009: 21).
Here, however, is where a rhetorical approach to PD becomes, for American officials,
politically risky. Such an approach, after all, requires Washington to consider the real
possibility that its thinking, policies, and actions might be wrong – certainly an
anxiety-producing situation for US officials unaccustomed to debating policies in the
context of a global public sphere. Here, engagement is not a debate crafted to give the
impression of dialogue but, instead, one designed to genuinely engage. As rhetorical
scholar Robert Ivie puts it,
Exercising U.S. power without translating democratic values into actual practice forfeits
America’s best chance to mitigate the underlying causes of support for terrorism in a global
information age that makes imperative the accommodation of competing interests and
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perspectives. Pluralism on a global scale is the reality with which America must learn to
cope constructively. (Ivie, 2005: 145–146)
Ivie argues that adequately coping with the underlying sources of terrorism involves
developing a ‘political culture to acknowledge, deliberate, and constructively respond to
the competing interests of domestic and foreign Others’ (2005: 144). For Ivie, this polit-
ical culture would embrace the ideal of ‘agonistic pluralism’ (conflict among ‘consub-
stantial’ adversaries) rather than deliberative democracy’s emphasis on egalitarian
consensus. Ivie’s perspective, integrating the work of political theorist Chantal Mouffe
and literary theorist Kenneth Burke, recognizes that social cohesion and tolerance are
promoted by people ‘acting rhetorically upon themselves and one another. It does not
assume that agonistic politics are inherently self-correcting or that their potential for rea-
lizing democratic ideals is easily fulfilled’ (2005: 39).
As an idealized image of democracy, however, Ivie notes that this rhetorical approach
to public diplomacy remains only on the margins of America’s political consciousness.
Since the earliest days of the republic, democratic deliberation has been a negligible com-
ponent of US foreign policy. Arguably, this norm stems, in part at least, from the historical
circumstances surrounding executive powers, constitutional authority, and the latitude leg-
islators have given the President to conduct foreign affairs (Zegart, 1999). A rhetorical
approach to PD nevertheless would go far beyond the White House’s current objectives
to promote some kind of universal ‘recognition’ of mutual interests, ‘belief’ in America’s
‘constructive role,’ and ‘seeing’ issues and developments in ways that officials based in
Washington would prefer. Instead, it would require that US officials engage others by con-
sistently practicing the ideals upon which their democratic republic was built. We suggest
that Ivie’s ideal should constitute a goal or standard, one that at least counter-balances the
neorealist strategic norms that pervade contemporary foreign policy.
Having said this, however, even an ethically informed mode of engagement cannot
sidestep power asymmetries in international and intercultural relations (Shinar and
Bratic, 2010). These no doubt will continue to shape and structure interactions between
representatives of the American state and foreign publics. Arguably, many of the policies
that US officials cannot or will not change constitute the very underpinnings of the long,
deep, and violent history now informing militant anti-Americanism. At the very least,
following Obama’s claim in Cairo that ‘I have come here to seek a new beginning
between the United States and Muslims around the world,’ for engagement to mean more
than just a more sophisticated effort at manipulation, official Washington will need to
recognize its own policy contradictions. This would entail explaining not just to the
world but also to itself the reasons for its repeated hypocrisy concerning human rights,
its political-economic priorities in the Middle East, and its ongoing support of corrupt
and oppressive regimes around the world. For example, as Khouri recently explained
in The New York Times, ‘One cannot take seriously the United States or any other West-
ern government that funds political activism by young Arabs while it simultaneously
provides funds and guns that help cement the power of the very same Arab governments
the young social and political activists target for change’ (Khouri, 2010).
A final point to be made concerning the Obama administration’s embrace of engage-
ment involves, again, its marketing and public relations lineage. Rather than evaluating
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America’s dialogue with the world in terms of a democratic exchange, the effectiveness
of US public diplomacy is gauged in terms of America’s ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ image
and reputation. Evaluating complex opinions and perspectives increasingly is being left
to polling, focus groups, and, occasionally, the interpretive analyses of Washington-
based regional specialists. Nevertheless and, in part, because of these ‘metrics,’ the
US Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently found that, in return for
US$10 billion worth of communication initiatives (its estimate of total PD and strategic
communications spending since 2001), ‘limited data exist on the ultimate effect of U.S.
outreach efforts’ (US Government Accountability Office, 2009: 2). This ambiguity, not
coincidentally, parallels that surrounding the evaluation of public relations strategies
more broadly (Moloney, 2006).
The 2009 GAO report tells us that ‘agencies cite three inherent challenges in measur-
ing the effectiveness of their strategic communications [and PD] efforts. First, strategic
communications may only produce long-term, rather than immediate, effect. Second, it
is difficult to isolate the effect of strategic communications from other influences, such
as policy. Third, strategic communications often target audiences’ perceptions, which
are intangible and complex and thus difficult to measure’ (US Government Accountabil-
ity Office, 2009: 16). Despite these difficulties, the GAO recommends means of asses-
sing PD that parallel what marketers use to assess brands: ‘private-sector measurement
techniques that are used to measure results include the use of surveys and polling to
develop baseline data, immediate follow-up research, and additional tracking polls to
identify long-term changes over time’ (2009: 17).
Nowhere is consideration given to how these techniques make sense in light of the
structural conditions within which anti-US extremism has emerged. Nor is the time-
frame of its analysis – evaluating extremism as something born on September 11,
2001 – reflective of the historically entrenched nature of ‘the problem.’ In response,
we ought to consider the possibility that these narrowly defined means of measuring
anti-Americanism and the (in)effectiveness of PD may themselves entrench the myopic
norms that characterize US encounters with foreign publics. If, after all, PD policies
and the problems they supposedly are responding to are assessed using such limited
snapshots of measurable opinions, McLuhan’s insight that sometimes the medium is
the message takes on yet another meaning. The medium, in this instance, is the public
relations–marketing ontology now pervading public diplomacy, and the message is
that anti-American extremism is a problem best understood through the lens of measur-
able perspectives and opinions, not power asymmetries, history or, for that matter, the
absence of truly ethical modes of communication.
Conclusion
Despite today’s engagement consensus, it seems clear that US foreign policy will remain
largely determined by the country’s perceived political, economic, and military needs
instead of the outcome of ethically structured modes of communication. One last exam-
ple – America’s strategic priorities in light of Iran’s efforts to build a nuclear device –
may be used to summarize this point: ‘We [the United States] have to be willing to sit
and listen and evaluate,’ says Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, ‘without giving up what
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we view as a primary objective of the engagement, which is to do everything we can to
prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state’ (Clinton, 2009).
The contradictions entailed in engagement’s conceptualization and applications are,
not surprisingly, recognized by many foreign critics but not, it seems, its many domestic
enthusiasts. This disjuncture, we suggest, reflects the fact that engagement entails a dan-
gerous self-delusion. The result is a PD that can neither achieve its overly ambitious
goals, nor accurately assess why so many foreign nationals are aggressively anti-
American (or, when the country’s image ticks up for a moment – as in the months fol-
lowing Obama’s Cairo speech – why it falls again just as quickly). Nevertheless, the
influence of marketing and public relations techniques remain pervasive – so pervasive
that they delimit Washington’s intellectual capacity even to recognize the entrenched
policy conflicts that may well be at the heart of extremism’s ongoing influence.
The policy of engagement’s hollow promises of meaningful dialogue only underscore
America’s deep-rooted insecurity, fear of foreign influence, and (despite the Obama
administration’s reforms) its persistent unilateralism. Americans and their elected offi-
cials will need to come to terms with these conditions if any public diplomacy effort
is ever to achieve its lofty goals. John Foster Dulles stated in 1946, ‘There is no nation
which has attitudes so pure that they cannot be bettered by self-examination’ (Dulles,
quoted in Williams, 1959: 207).3 We agree.
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Notes
1. Prosumption is defined here as the blurring gap between producers and consumers (Tapscott,
1996). As Tapscott noted, ‘Every consumer on the information highway becomes a producer
by creating and sending a message to a colleague, contributing to a bulletin-board discussion
group, altering the end of a movie, test driving a virtual car, or visualizing the brain of a patient
across the country’ (1996: 63).
2. Khouri is also editor-at-large of the Daily Star newspaper in Beirut.
3. Tragically, as Williams notes, ‘Dulles . . . mislaid his own advice in subsequent years’ (Wil-
liams, 1959: 207).
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